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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KARL WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES,
a partnership,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 15501

vs.

M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., a Utah corporation,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
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INTRODUCTION
In order to facilitate continuity throughout this
brief, the parties will be referred to herein either by name
or in their respective capacities in the Court below:

KARL

WINSNESS AND ASSOCIATES - Plaintiff; M. J. CONOCO DISTRIBUTORS,
INC. - Defendant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff Karl Winsness
and Associates against Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors,
Inc. relating to a land lease agreement dated November 24, 1971,
and subsequently modified by the terms of a judgment entered
April 22, 1974, covering the lease of certain land by Plaintiff
to the Defendant, located in Delle, Utah.
Plaintiff-Lessor alleged that Defendant-Lessee breached
the lease by failing to run the service station on a 24-hour
basis, by incorrectly reporting the gallonage sold at the station,
by failing to construct a sewage lagoon, and by failing to keep
the station and premises in good repair.
Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. counterclaimed
asserting that the Plaintiff had wrongfully encroached upon
Defendant's leasehold and intentionally interferred with Defendant's construction of the lagoon system.

1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed this action on August 25, 1975.

During

the pleading stage of this case several amended complaints were
filed by the Plaintiff including one on March 22, 1976.

Defen-

dant answered Plaintiff's first amended complaint on March 30,
1976, while at the same time filing a counterclaim against
Plaintiff.
On June 14, 1977, a jury trial was commenced in Tooele
county before the Honorable Peter F .. Leary.

At the conclusion

of Plaintiff's case Defendant moved for a directed verdict as
to all five of Plaintiff's counts.

Judge Leary directed a verdict

as to four of Plaintiff's causes of action but reserved his ruling
concerning the first cause of action for later determination.
(Tr. A-45 to A-47)

At the conclusion of the Court's ruling on

Defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the Defendant rested
asking leave of the Court to strike and dismiss its counterclaim
against Plaintiff, which leave was granted.

(Tr. A-48)

Additional

argument was given by both the Defendant and Plaintiff concerning
a directed verdict as to Plaintiff's first count.

The Court

subsequently granted Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's first
cause of action and dismissed the jury.

(Tr. 533-535)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the lower Court
2
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in favor of the Defendant M. J. Conoco Distributors , Inc . an a
against Plaintiff Karl Winsness and Associates affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant views the purported statement of facts set
forth in Plaintiff's brief as an argumentative exposition of
the evidence.

Accordingly, Defendant elects to make a brief

statement of the facts involved in this case.
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a land lease
agreement dated November 24, 1971, wherein Plaintiff leased
certain land to Defendant in Delle, Utah, for the purpose of
constructing and operating a service station thereon.

(Ex. P-51

Delle, Utah, is located approximately 61 miles from Salt Lake
City on the road to Wendover and consisted solely of an old,
small cafe, motel and service station.

(Tr. 33-34)

The present

service station is approximately one-half mile from the existing
cafe and motel units.

There is no permanent housing located at

Delle and the only residents are those involved in operating
the facilities just mentioned.

There is no permanent water suppl;

and all water must be brought in by truck.

Subsequent to the

signing of the land lease agreement Defendant built its service
station which it opened to the public sometime in July, 1972.
(Tr. 96)
On October 3, 1972, Plaintiff filed an action in the
3
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Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Civil No. 7761,
claiming that Defendant had breached the land lease agreement
dated November 24, 1971.
At the conclusion of the trial of that action a
stipulation was entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant
resolving the issues between the parties which included Plaintiff's claim that Defendant had not operated the station on a
24-hour basis.

(Ex. P-6)

The stipulation was signed on April 5, 1974, and pursuant
thereto a judgment was entered by the Honorable Gordon Hall on
April 22, 1974, which incorporated the provisions agreed to by
the parties in their stipulation.

(Ex. P-7)

The 1974 stipulation required Defendant to build a
lagoon sewage system for its new service station and the restaurant
facility which was to be built by Plaintiff.

(Ex. P-6)

Defendant

commenced to build the lagoon system and completed same in August,
1974.

(Ex. P-38)

However, the Plaintiff not having constructed

the proposed restaurant, there was never enough effluent to
permit final testing and stabilizing of the plastic liner to
the lagoon.

(Tr.

280-281)

On August 25, 1975, Plaintiff filed the complaint in
this action setting forth four causes of action against Defendant.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had breached the lease agreement
and 1974 judgment by failing to operate the service station on

4
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a 24-hour basis, by failing to complete the lagoon system, and
by failing to keep the service station in good repair.

Plain-

tiff also demanded an accounting of the number of gallons sold
at Delle, Utah·, from 1974 to the time the complaint was filed.
On March 22, 1976, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint
seeking punitive damages and adjusting upward its damages for
counts one, three and four.
Defendant filed its answer to the amended complaint
together with a counterclaim on March 30, 1976.

Defendant allegec

in its counterclaim that Plaintiff had interferred with the
construction of the lagoon system and had breached the lease
agreement by interferring with Defendant's quiet enjoyment of
its leasehold.
Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on February
10, 1977, which was objected to by the Defendant.

(R. 271-284)

on April 4, 1977, the Honorable Peter F. Leary entered his pretrial order denying Plaintiff's motion to file its third amended
complaint except as to the second cause of action.

Following

the pretrial order Defendant moved for leave to file an amended
answer and counterclaim.

(R. 381-388)

Judge Leary allowed the

filing of the amended answer but denied Defendant's motion to
file an amended counterclaim.
A jury trial in this matter was commenced on June 141
1977, before the Honorable Peter F. Leary at the Tooele County
5
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courthouse.

The issues which remained to be tried after pretrial

were (1) Plaintiff's claim that the station was not operated on
a 24-hour basis;

(2) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant had failed

to report the correct amount of gallonage sold at the station
in Delle, Utah;

(3) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant had failed

to complete the lagoon system;

(4) Plaintiff's claim that Defen-

dant had failed to keep the service station in good repair;

(5)

Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages; and (6) Defendant's
claim that Plaintiff had interferred with the construction of
the lagoon system and had breached the lease agreement by interferring with Defendant's quiet enjoyment of its leasehold.

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DIRECTING A VERDICT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON ITS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IS
CORRECT IN LAW.
This Court has held on numerous occasions that it is
error for the Court to allow the jury to speculate on the evidence,
and that unless there is competent evidence to support a cause
of action the trial judge should not submit the question to the
jury.

In Jackson v. Colston et al., 209 P.2d 566, 116 Utah 295,

Justice Latimer speaking for the majority stated:
"It is fundamental . . . that the Court may not
permit the jury to speculate concerning defendants'
6
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liability; Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County
Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P.2d 660; and that
the court is required to direct a verdict
unless there is evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find in favor of the
plaintiff."
See also Olson et al. v. Warwood et al., 225 P. 2d 725, 119 Utah
175; and ~~~~~---'-~-:...::;...__;:.........::..:.::..=-=-=..=..:=.:::_:_:.:::..:::..::..:::..::.c:.:._~.=..=.::.:::~:.....::~o'....:..,
Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad c
292
P.2d 849, 4 Utah 2d 255.
In the present case Plaintiff's evidence was such that
Judge Leary had no choice but to direct a verdict in favor of
the Defendant on Plaintiff's first cause of action.

While Plain·

tiff's witnesses testified that on several unspecified occasions
the station was closed, not one of them testified as to what
caused the closure or the duration of the closure.

Plaintiff

testified that he did not know why the service station was closec
except that the operator on one occasion said he was tired.
(Tr. 156)

Mildred Sims, after admitting that there had been

problems in getting help both at the current restaurant facility,
which is approximately one-half mile from the service station,
and at the service station, admitted that she didn't know the
reason why the station had been closed on several occasions.
(Tr. 203)

If there was any consistent pattern running throughoui

all of the testimony given by Plaintiff's witnesses it was that
there was always difficulty in getting help at the service
station, and that they were not aware of the reasons behind the

7
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service station being closed at various times.

Defendant submits

that there was no evidence before the Court to aid the jury in
determining whether Defendant had breached the lease agreement
by not operating the service station on a 24-hour basis.

The

fact that the station was closed periodically was not evidence
that Defendant was not making every effort to run the station on
a 24-hour basis.

Taking the evidence in a light most favorable

to Plaintiff the jury had no guidance as to the number of times
the station was closed, the time of day, how long it was closed
or the reason for the closure.

It would have been pure specu-

lation on the jury's part as to why the station was closed, the
duration of the closure, and whether any of the closures resulted
in a breach of the lease, or would have been excused as unavoidable.
There were no parameters for the jury's guidance in assessing
the damages, if any, occasioned by the closures of the station.
Any action by the jury to assess damages would of necessity have
been entirely conjectural and speculative.
The rule for determination of damages recoverable by
a plaintiff is summarized in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 24, wherein
it states:
"The principle which will not allow the
recovery of damages when their existence rests
solely on speculation applies both to the fact
of damages and to their cause. Thus, a .
plaintiff cannot recover damages by proving
only that the defendant has unla~fu~ly violated some duty owing to the plaintiff,
8
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leaving the trier of fact to speculate as
to the damages; he must go further and
prove the nature and extent of the damage
suffered by the plaintiff and that the
breacp of duty was the legal cause of that
damage.
Leaving either of these damage
questions to speculation on the part of
the trier of fact will prevent recovery.
Therefore, no recovery can be had in those
cases in which it is uncertain whether
the plaintiff suffered any damage. Also,
no recovery is allowed when resort to
speculation or conjecture is necessary to
determine whether the damage resulted from
the unlawful act of which complaint is made
or from some other source.
In the present case, Plaintiff failed to show with any degreeo:
certainty that he was in fact damaged.

Further, Plaintiff did

not introduce any competent evidence that he suffered any damage
caused by the isolated closures of the service station.
In Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456, 2 Utah 2d 144, this
Court held:
"'Only such damages are recoverable as are shown
with reasonable certainty to have been sustained.
Remote, contingent and conjectural losses will
not be considered.'"
The rent provision of the lease reads as follows:
"RENT. To pay to the lessor a monthly
'gallonage' rental on all gasoline and
other motor fuel excluding diesel fuel
sold to the storage tanks on the premises
as follows:
(a)
For a period commencing May 15th
through and including September 15th of
the same year, payment shall be made at
the rate of four cents (.04¢) per gallon;
for the period commencing September 16th
9
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through and including May 14th of the
following year, payment shall be made at
the rate of two cents (.02¢) per gallon.
{b)
To pay to the lessor as a monthly
gallonage rental on all diesel fuel sold
at the subject premises for the period
commencing May 15th through and including
September 15th of the same year, payment
shall be made at the rate of three cents
(.03¢) per gallon, and for the period
commencing September 16th through and including May 14th of the following year,
payments shall be made at the rate of two
cents (.02¢) per gallon.
(c)
In addition to the gallonage rentals
above provided for, lessee shall pay to the
lessor the sum of $300.00 per calendar month
as 'ground rent' which shall be due and
payable in advance on the first day of each
calendar month.
The $300.00 ground rent
shall be applied first against the $6,321.15
bill outstanding less payments which have
been made on the prior lease dated the 9th
day of January, 1970."
(Ex. P-5)
There is no evidence whatever in the record to show that Plaintiff
had not been paid the exact amount due him under the rental provisions of the lease.

It is important to note that the lease

does not require the Defendant to sell any particular quantity
of gasoline whatever but only to pay to the Plaintiff the agreed
upon ground rental and the gallonage rental on the gasoline
actually sold.

The lease is clear on its face concerning the

rental payments and there is no contention by Plaintiff that the
Defendant failed to pay rentals in accordance with the lease.
Plaintiff complains that if the station had been kept open more,
more gasoline would have been sold.

This calls for speculation

10
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on two premises;

(1)

the failure to have the station open was

the fault of the Defendant.
on this point; and (2)

There is no conclusive evidence

that had the station been open, more

gasoline would have been sold.
kind on this point.

There is no evidence of any

The jury would have been left to unlimited

speculation in making a determination of damages on the Plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff's only witness concerning the damages
occasioned by Defendant's alleged failure to operate the service
station on a 24-hour basis was Delbert Taylor, who had been a
district sales representative for Husky Oil Company.

(Tr. 446)

Mr. Taylor testified that he had made estimates of the gallonage
that several existing service stations owned by Husky Oil shoulc
pump if they were operating at full capacity.

(Tr. 4 4 9-450)

He stated that in making his projections he took into considerat
location, traffic count and past history.

(Tr. 472)

He further

stated that based upon the traffic count, location and amount
of gallonage pumped at the Delle service station in 1971, it
was his opinion that the station should pump three times as much
gallonage as it was pumping.
The witness also testified that based upon the traffic
count, which showed that, for example, the peak traffic at the
Delle station on July 10, 1976, occurred between the hours of
11:00 o'clock at night and 12:00 a.m., he determined that the
11
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station should be operated on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
462)

(Tr. 4 59 ,

However, it was later stipulated to by all counsel that

Mr. Taylor had made a mistake in reading the traffic count in

that the peak hour of traffic was from 11:00 o'clock a.m. to
12:00 p.m., rather than from 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. as previously
testified to by Mr. Taylor.

(Tr. A-3)

This error is extremely

important inasmuch as the witness had testified earlier that his
opinion concerning the hours of operation of the service station
was based primarily upon the traffic count.
Defendant submits that Mr. Taylor's testimony concerning
the service station at Delle was totally lacking in credibility.
He stated that if the station were open 24 hours a day it would
do three times the business, yet he admitted that he had no
personal knowledge of what percent of the time the station was
presently open.

His testimony concerning the 24-hour operation

was based on a traffic count, however he later admitted that he
had erred in his reading of the traffic count.

He testified that

his opinion was based to some extent on past performance, namely
1971, yet he admitted the circumstances had changed drastically
since 1971.

Further, the fact of the matter is that the station

in question was not even built until the middle of 1972. (Tr. 96)
The clearest example of the lack of credibility of

Mr. Taylor's testimony is found in reading the transcript of
the trial wherein Mr. Taylor, in answer to a question posed to
12
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him by Plaintiff's own counsel concerning the projections he
had made for other gas stations, stated:
"Well, the projections I made for the
service station, of course, I knew every
aspect about the particular location . .
That's every aspect.
I knew the past history of them, I knew what the operator was
like, I knew what the upkeep and maintenance
of the service station, I knew what it
looked like, I knew what the location was;
whether or not it was easy to get in and
out of, and everything that was in consideration . . . That way I could pick and
choose it much better."
(Tr. 505)
In regard to the service station at Delle, Mr. Taylor admitted
that he knew very little about the station or the conditions
existing there with exception of the traffic count which he had
misinterpreted.

This witness' testimony lacked the

to permit submission to the jury.

credibili~

The Court, as a matter of

law, could not submit this testimony, flawed as it was by the
error in reading the traffic count on which Mr. Taylor based
his computations and his admitted lack of knowledge of the other
factors which he testified were essential to an adequate evaluat:
It is further to be noted that Plaintiff did not offer any corre'
tion or revision of the testimony of this witness after these
fundamental errors were manifested.

The Court, therefore, had

no choice but to take this matter from the jury as there was no
other evidence from which the jury could draw any conclusion as
to the purported loss of business.

13
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In 1972 Justice Ellett wrote the followi'ng concerning
·
speculative damages:
"If there is substantial evidence to
the findi~gs upon which the judgment
is rendered, the Judgment must be sustained.
The fact that it is difficult to calculate
damages will not prevent an injured party
from recovery. However, a judgment cannot
be based upon mere speculation. . • Kratzer
lost one day's sale of bread because of
the wrongful eviction; but since it was in
business after a few·hours' delay, it is
not possible to say with any degree of
certainty how much damage was caused to it
other than the loss of the sale for that
one day. Under the evidence given in this
case any other damage which can be ascribed
to the wrongful conduct of the appellant
is purely speculative." Monter v. Kratzers
Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d
40 (1972) (Emphasis added)
~upport

In the Kratzer case, supra, there was a wrongful eviction which
resulted in some definable damage from the bakery being closed.
In the case at bar there is no evidence of the exact time when
the station was closed, why the station was closed, or how long
it was closed.

For the trial judge to have permitted the jury

to speculate not only as to whether there was a breach of the
lease, but the duration of the breach and the damages resulting
therefrom, if any, would have allowed a degree of speculation
and conjecture which this Court has never permitted.
Defendant submits the calculation of damages, if any,
by the jury in this case would have been impossible and that

Judge Leary followed clearly established principles of law as
14
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set forth in the cases cited above by granting Defendant's moti

for a directed verdict as to Plaintiff's first cause of acti~.

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DIRECTING A VERDICT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON ITS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND IS
CORRECT IN LAW.
Plaintiff's third cause of action was for an alleged
breach of the lease agreement as modified by a stipulation and
subsequent judgment entered April 22, 1974.

Plaintiff contende1

that Defendant had failed to complete the lagoon system called
for in those two documents.

Defendant answered asserting that

it had, in fact, built the lagoon system and that any delay in
its completion was the result of governmental agencies and the

Plaintiff, whose actions were beyond the control of the Defendill
The provision of the 1974 judgment which relates to
the lagoon system reads as follows:
"The lagoon system provided for under the
terms of this Stipulation shall be designed
and constructed at the sole expense and cost
of Defendant.
Said lagoon system will be
constructed in a square configuration which
square shall be twenty (20) feet wider than
the width of the ponds presently engineered
by Nielsen and Maxwell Engineers.
The lagoon
system shall be designed and constructed
to comply with the minimum requirements of
the State of Utah and the County of Tooele.
All expenses and costs of maintenance and
operation of the lagoon system after completion of construction shall be borne equally

15
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by the parties.
Each of the parties shall
bear their own costs of connecting their
respective facilities to the pump station.
"That Defendant will commence construction of the lagoon system at Delle, Utah
within a reasonable time after execution'
of this Stipulation and will complete the
same within one (1) year from March 8, 1974,
except as may be excused due to acts of
God, or other causes beyond the control of
Defendant."
(Ex. P-7)
Following the 1974 judgment Defendant began to construct the lagoon system and in fact the system was completed
in August, 1974.

(Ex. P-38)

From August, 1974, until the

time of trial Defendant had attempted to get final approval from
the State Department of Health which has been denied for various
reasons.

Plaintiff produced no evidence at trial to dispute the

fact that Defendant had indeed constructed a lagoon system as
required by the stipulation.

Instead, Plaintiff argued that Defen-

dant had breached its duty under the stipulation because final
approval had not been given on the system by the State Board of
Health.

(Tr. 403, 407)
Plaintiff called Art Maxwell who was the original

engineer hired to develop the plans for the lagoon system.

On

cross-examination Mr. Maxwell gave the following testimony concerning the feasibility of operating a lagoon system using only
the waste water from the existing service station:
"Very difficult, unless you--unless you
pumped in or brought in from some other
sources some to start it.
16
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"That 2,000 gallons a day would-would strike
level some place where as
the surface area increased the evaporation
would increase, and it would start taking
up its full 2,000.

a

"Basing the 5,000 gallons on a need for
two p~nds, it would appear that through
the winter months that would build up to
~erhaps five feet of depth in one pond;
JUSt taking 40 percent of the total area.
"And in the sUirnner months it would
probably reduce that down to where you
may have less than three feet.
"At best I would say the operation would
be very difficult with only a service station
under full water supply; yes."
(Tr. 280-281)
(Emphasis added)
The State Division of Health recognized this probl9
and allowed Defendant to construct a small lagoon within the
first lagoon to handle the waste water until the restaurant
facilities were built.

(Ex. P-47, paragraph 5)

Defendant's construction of the lagoon system, at
the very least, substantially complied with the provisions of
the 1974 stipulation.

The doctrine of substantial performance

well stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Sharp v. Twin Lakes
Corp., 283 P.2d 611, wherein Chief Justice Merrill ruled:
"It is now well established as the general
rule with respect to building contracts that
the law implies a substantial rather than
a literal or exact performance of the terms
of the contract.
See Lloyd on the Law of
Building and Buildings, 2d Ed. Sec. 31, 39;
9 Am. Jur. 30, Building and Construction
Contracts, Sec. 40; Annotations 24 L.R.A.,
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N.S., 327; 134 Arn. St. Rep. 679. It would
seem to follow, a fortiori, that a covenant
by a lessee to make improvements upon the
leased premises is to be given a reasonable
interpretation in the light of the purposes
to be served and the result sought to be
accomplished and that, as against the lessor
substantial compliance with the covenant
'
is sufficient."
see also Larsen v. Thoresen, 254 P.2d 656.

The Sharp case,

supra, is similar to the case at bar in that it involved a covenant by a lessee to make certain improvements to the leased
property.
Again the testimony at trial was that the lagoon system
had been built since 1974 but the requirements for final approval
had not been met because the system could not be made operable
until the restaurant facility was built.

The Defendant submits

that the requirements of the 1974 stipulation were met by Defendant
in that a lagoon system was built to dispose of the sewage from
both the existing service station and the restaurant facility
which was to be built by Plaintiff.

If there was a breach, it

was on the part of the Plaintiff and not of the Defendant.

The

fact that one of the considerations for Defendant's building of
the lagoon system was Plaintiff's representation that he would
build a restaurant is uncontroverted.

The stipulated judgment

reads as follows:
"That Karl Winsness & Associates shall
furnish to the Defendant at no cost an easement and sufficient land to allow a lagoon
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system to.be constructed upon the premises
of Karl Winsness & Associates at Delle Utah
said lagoon system is to serve Defenda~t's
'
existing service station and the new restaurant to be constructed in the future
by Karl Winsness . . . It is expressly understood that the lagoon system is to serve
the Defendant's service station and the new
restaurant to be built by Karl Winsness only
and that no other facilities or improvements
will be connected to said lagoon system
except other facilities mutually agreed upon
at the new site, which will not overload the
lagoon system."
(Ex. P-7)
An analogous situation to the one presented in this
case is one of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

A Uniform

Real Estate Contract provides that upon the payment of the
entire consideration for the property the seller must provide
marketable title to the buyer.

However, until the buyer has

paid for the property in full the seller is under no such du~.
See Woodward v. Allen, 265 P.2d 398, 1 Utah 2d 220, and Naylor
v. Solley, 111 P.2d 142, 100 Utah 130.

In the present case

Defendant had a duty to build the lagoon system which it did.
However, the duty on the part of the Defendant to have the
system approved for operation should not exist until there is
a restaurant to use the facility,

just as the duty to give

marketable title under a Uniform Real Estate Contract does not
exist until all of the payments are made.

For Judge Leary to

have allowed the Plaintiff to force the Defendant to expend an
additional several thousand dollars on a lagoon system that is

19
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inoperable without the restaurant facility would certainly
have been error.
Even if, for the sake of argument, the Defendant was
technically in breach of the 1974 stipulation, Plaintiff was not
damaged in any way as a result of said breach.

During cross-

examination Karl Winsness gave the following testimony concerning
the present condition of the lagoon system:
"A.
Now, assuming all of that work needed
to be done, couldn't that be done in the space
of two weeks?

A. I don't know. I imagine it could.
We'll have an expert I imagine testify on it.
I talked to a gentleman in regards to it,
the cost of it and the time on it.
I don't
know.
I imagine.
I've had experience with
this before and we've never complied with
anything I've asked them to do before, so-Q. Well, now, I'm not .asking you whether
you asked them to comply with it.
I'm
asking you if it isn't reasonable to assume
that these changes could be accomplished in
the length of time which it would require you
to construct your restaurant.
A. Well, yes. They could be in the time
I construct it; yes."
(Tr. 145-146) (Emphasis
added)
When asked about why he had not built the restaurant

Mr. Winsness answered as follows:
"Q.
That's all. Now Mr. Winsness, had you
at any time ever applied for a building permit
for your restaurant?

A.

Yes.
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"Q.

When?

A.

1971, I believe.

Q.

Was i t granted?

A.

Yes.

Q.
So then you had a proper building
permit to go ahead and build?

A.

Yes.

Q. And did the Board of Health ever
tell you that you could not build your
facility?

A.
They didn't tell me I could not
build it; no."
(Tr. 154-155)
From Karl Winsness' own testimony it is clear that
the decision not to build the restaurant was Plaintiff's and
no one else's.

Had the Plaintiff begun construction of the

restaurant by his own admission, there would have been little
difficulty in completing the necessary adjustments in the lagoon
system far in advance of the restaurant's completion.

Until

the Plaintiff constructs a restaurant facility to comply with
the clear understanding stated in the 1974 stipulation there shoe
be no duty placed upon the Defendant to have the system finally
approved for operation inasmuch as there won't be sufficient
sewage to operate it.
The fact is that Plaintiff has suffered no damage
whatever as a result of the lagoon system not being approved
by the Board of Health.

Until there is a restaurant to use
21
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the lagoon system the lack of final approval of the system
is of no consequence to Plaintiff.

Point III
JUDGE LEARY'S EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT 35 WAS CORRECT IN LAW INASMUCH AS
IT WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence adopted by this
Court on February 17, 1971, and effective July 1, 1971, gives
a judge considerable latitude concerning the admission or

exclusion of evidence.

Rule 45 reads:

"Except as in these rules otherwise provided,
the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the
risk that its admission will (a} necessitate
undue consumption of time, or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice or
of confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully
surprise a party who has not had reasonable
opportunity to anticipate that such evidence
would be offered."
Exhibit 35 offered by Plaintiff was a chart purportedly
showing the gallonage sold at Delle, Utah, in 1972.

Plaintiff

claimed at the time of trial and later in its brief submitted
to this Court that Exhibit 35 was meant to be used to establish
a basis for comparison from which the jury could find the

gallonage which the now-existing service station at Delle would

pump if operated on a 24-hour basis.

(Tr. 133-134 and Plaintiff's
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brief, page 29)
it, too.

However, Plaintiff cannot have its cake and e~

Paragraph 8 of the 1974 judgment upon which Plaintiff

relies reads in part as follows:
"That Karl Winsness & Associates and
M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. hereby
mutually release and waive any rights,
claims or causes of action that either
party may have or claim against the other
for any alleged breach of any of the terms
of the written lease of the parties dated
the 24th day of November 1971 [,] [p] rior
to the date of this Stipulation[.]
[S]aid
mutual release and waiver shall include
but not be limited to the following claims:
(8) failure to keep the station open
24 hours a day."
(Ex. P-7) (Emphasis added)
[sic] - correction of manifest typographical
error in judgment
Plaintiff has also stated in its brief at page 2:
"In 1972 a dispute arose between the
plaintiff and defendant as to the interpretation of this leasing agreement. An
action was filed in the Third Judicial
Court of Tooele County, Civil No. 7761,
by plaintiffs asking for certain remedies
against defendant.
Plaintiff charged that
the defendant had failed to maintain 24hour-a-day service, had failed to pay rent
as provided in the contract, and had failed
to build a sewage lagoon as agreed upon
in the leasing contract."
(Plaintiff's
brief, page 2) (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff cannot with consistency claim that in 1972 the service
station was not being run on a 24-hour-a-day basis and then
propose an exhibit consisting of the gallonage sold in 1972
as evidence of what the present sales would be if the station
were kept open 24 hours a day.
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An additional deficiency in Exhibit 35 is that it
lacks credibility for other reasons:

(1) Karl Winsness testi-

fied at trial that the new service station was opened sometime
in July, 1972.

(Tr. 96)

Therefore, Exhibit 35 represented

gallonage sold at the old service station during the first
six and one-half months of 1972;

(2) the old station was ad-

jacent to the existing restaurant facilities at Delle, which
are approximately one-half mile from the new service station;
(Tr. 33)

(3) during 1972 the construction of the freeway was

proceeding with many employees using the service station solely
for this reason;

(Tr. 163,227)

(4) the gasoline or energy

shortage developed in late 1973 thus making comparison with
1972 figures precarious as the traffic patterns changed;

(Tr.

234-235) and (5) Exhibit 35 shows the gallonage sold at Delle
skyrocketed during July and August, 1972, only to fall off
drastically in October, November and December of that year.
Marvin Baird, the operator of the service station and restaurant
facilities at Timpie, Utah, was called as a witness by Plaintiff.
He testified that his facilities are approximately seven miles
from Delle and were first opened in October, 1972.

(Tr. 325-326)

Correlating the above-mentioned changed conditions with Exhibit
35, it becomes apparent that during the vast majority of the
period represented by Exhibit 35, the conditions that affected
the amount of gallonage sold were entirely different than those
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existing during 1974 through 1977.

There is no way that validity

could be given to this proposed Exhibit 35 for the purpose which
Plaintiff offered it.

CONCLUSION
It was the duty of the Plaintiff to present a prima
facie case concerning the Defendant's breach of the lease agreement as modified by the 1974 stipulation.

This it did not do,

either as to the operation of the station or the building of
the lagoon system.
The record is conclusive in that not one shred of
evidence was presented by Plaintiff to establish that the Defendant was not operating the service station on a 24-hour-a-day
basis.

None of Plaintiff's witnesses could testify as to why

the station had periodically been closed.

Delle, Utah, is an

isolated outpost between Salt Lake City and Wendover, Utah, a
result of which is that the closures could have been for numerous
reasons that would not have constituted a breach of the lease by
Defendant.

There was simply no evidence presented upon which

the jury could have concluded that a breach had, in fact, occurrec
Plaintiff also failed in its attempt to show the arno~t
of damages, if any, occasioned by the closures of the station.
The testimony of Plaintiff's only witness concerning damages was
incompetent and totally lacking in credibility.

The jury would
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therefore have been left to speculate, not only as to whether
a breach occurred, but also what damages were suffered by
Plaintiff as a result of the breach.
Exhibit 35 lacked any credibility whatsoever and was
therefore properly excluded by Judge Leary pursuant to Rule 45
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The testimony concerning the lagoon system was that
it has been built since 1974, waiting for Plaintiff to construct its restaurant.

The decision not to build the restaurant

has been Plaintiff's alone and until Plaintiff has a reason to
use the system, a lack of final approval by the Board of Health
is of no consequence to Plaintiff.
Judge Leary was compelled in this case, given the total
lack of evidence presented by Plaintiff, to grant Defendant's
motion for a directed verdict as to all five of Plaintiff's
counts, which he did.

The trial judge, under the standards

heretofore applied and recognized under the law in acquitting
his duty to evaluate the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff to
determine whether a prima facie case had been made, had no choice
but to grant Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on all
five counts of the complaint.

Plaintiff admits the validity

of the court's action as to three of the counts.

The two counts

on which the Plaintiff challenges the lower court's action were
equally flawed.
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The carefully considered decision of the lower court
is not only correct in law but applied sound and recognized
moral and ethical standards in evaluating the contractual
relation between the parties.

The result achieved by the

court's decision is just and equitable.

The decision of the

lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
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